

labour is required between politicians, managers and commanders, while maintaining the cohesion of the institution and the coordination of all organisational processes”¹¹⁷.

In present, this is a very challenging issue and every country decides, based on historical traditions, social development and overall bureaucratic culture.

A way – Social Systems Approach

A defence *ministry is a large, highly complex organisation* no matter the size of the national armed forces. Such organisation is as a “lively set of interrelated systems designed to perform complicated tasks.”¹¹⁸ In the modern defence understanding, this institution begins to recognise that national defence as a *political* and *social* function of the state/government, performed in a social systems context.

The draft final version of the decisions on national defence, well or not supported by information and analyses, is determined by foreign policy considerations, internal politics, intra-governmental affairs, public-private relations and even individual behaviour. Modern public affairs, from the end of the former ideological and strategic struggle and the ongoing rapid advances of globalisation and informatisation are complex, diverse and dynamic and, in the some way, the modern defence management is also complex, diverse and dynamic.

The scope of the governance of defence is to define it in operational terms – what is it, what does it aim for, and how does it benefit society and the defence institution itself. Following this line of basic management theory, it is useful to consider the external and internal contexts of defence management as interacting systems of a social nature¹¹⁹. Apparently, the defence institution is located among the most comprehensive social systems – the international political system to which the country belongs and the particular national social system. Both have distinct, and in many cases very different, types of „input” into defence management (Figure 1)¹²⁰.

The international system:

- exerts influence through the spread of threat perceptions, diplomatic manoeuvres, military technology developments, and creation of alliances and ad-hoc coalitions, among others.
- is multi-dimensional and generally there is considerable conflict within it.

¹¹⁷ Ibidem 1, pg 46

¹¹⁸ Harold J. Leavitt, *Managerial Psychology: An Introduction to Individuals, Pairs, and Groups in Organizations* (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1972), Chapter 24.

¹¹⁹ Briefly, a social system consists of two or more socially recognised actors who interact in variety of ways in achieving a common purpose or goal.

¹²⁰ An adapted version of a diagram used by Richard Norton in “Policy Making and Process: A Guide to Case Analysis,” in *Case Studies in Policy Making*, ed. Hayat Alvi-Aziz and Stephen F. Knott, 11th edition (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2008). Security and Defence Management Series no. 1, Cap. 2, *Governance, Management, Command, Leadership: Setting the Context*, pg 39.

The term “democratic community” underline the common values and threat perceptions and contribute to the *prevention*, *pre-emption* and *resolution* of conflicts and these explain, in this way, the policies (including the defence policies) of those governments. In this international puzzle, the system is dominated by the behaviour of states and the international inputs to national defence policies, and also is determined by the impact of international security and defence organisations and by non-governmental actors of a social (e.g., Amnesty International, Greenpeace) or business nature.




Figure 1 System Perspective on Defence Policy Decision-making.

Our national defence system is defined by the roles and mission of a defence institution, its strategy and organisation and has to provide available resources based mainly on the social perception for security-insecurity. Generally, it has to avoid the cutbacks of civil and democratic freedoms and radical decisions on regulations, defence budgets, and large-scale restructuring and contingency measures are adopted with relative ease. The defence institution should be able to assimilate all these inputs, using its cognitive capacity and producing outputs that both the national and international system expects to be rational and adequate in the circumstances.

In spite in the general construction of the defence architecture governance, the very important point is the organisational, from the respective process, but more decisive is the influence of the bureaucratic culture, organisational behaviour and the people in the institution. For these reasons, no ministry of defence is equal to another even in mature democracies. To illustrate this statement, a defence manager failing to see the people behind institutional charts is a recipe for disaster. In summary, the international and national political systems provide complex, continuous strategic and situational inputs into the defence policy decision making process. They may also be seen as “customers” of the national “defence product”. The highest importance for the defence policymaking have the international security environment, the foreign policy and security profile of the country, the governmental defence policy process and the roles of different stakeholders in its formulation and implementation.

The defence institution has all characteristics of the entire society such as traditions, culture, dynamics, internal relations, including the particularities during political transformation from totalitarianism towards democracy. The defence institution is crafted by people with their particular culture, interests and priorities that vary not only from one country to another but also, depending on a certain „historical time,” personal agendas or goals.¹²¹

It has a specific organisation and operates under (frequently) unique norms, regulations and procedures in order to transform financial, material, human, and informational resources, dedicated by the society, into a „defence product.”

All this represents the internal context of defence management. Its particular aspect is that decision making on most important defence issues is not closed within the defence ministry, not even within the government.

The head of the state and especially the legislative branch play specific roles that in many cases reflect the specific national division and balance of political power, not only the rationale on defence matters. All these together represent the unique element of defence management – *its fundamental civil-military character*. These relations have pivotal role in defence management and that is exactly what makes different in defence area from any other governmental institution.

The articulation, strategic balancing and protection of the interests of national centres of political power are all responsibilities of the civilian leadership, while implementation is about the military. This sets the stage for a conflict.

The conflict is essential and „natural” for a democratic society and defence governance is dedicated to overcome it through the power of leadership and use of management skills. This is the moment to underline that only in this context the use of merely business management practices to run national defence is associated with failures. So are ambitions to apply completely bureaucratised planning and budgeting procedures that ignore advances made in business management.¹²²

In brief, the most important contextual internal shapers of defence policy are the defence institution with its human, financial and material resources, the national military doctrine and the maturity of national civil-military relations.

Integrated Context of Defence Management

In making defence management a rational instrument for defence institution-building, reform or transformation begins with recognising that all parties involved—politicians, managers and commanders—operate in specific external and internal contexts. It is important for politicians, managers, and commanders to understand and recognise how these contextual specifics influence the development of the defence institution and its performance. The continuum of

¹²¹ Thomas C. Bruneau, *Ministries of Defense and Democratic Civil-Military Relations*, Faculty research papers (Monterey, CA: Center for Civil-Military Relations, Naval Postgraduate School, 2001).

¹²² Security and Defence Management Series no. 1, Valeri Ratchev, Cap. 2, *Governance, Management, Command, Leadership: Setting the Context*, pg 39.

defence policy formulation, implementation and evaluation describes the integrity of the external and internal context of defence institution (Figure 3¹²³).




Figure 3 Internal and External Context of Defence Management.

The output („product”) of the defence system in a social context is generally the public and social sense of security and the defence and military capabilities that can be used by the government in different forms for variety of purposes. The measurement of the „defence product” is a specific management problem. The existence of multiple stakeholders prescribes different evaluators – what is good for the minister of defence may not satisfy the requirements of senior military; what satisfies the military may not be accepted by the society, and so on.

From the point of view of business management, the defence product is also complicated by the absence of “competitors” or a “market test”. This is only inside of the military system of services. The fact that each military service—Army, Navy, or Air Force—has unique capabilities, doctrine, culture, and traditions creates another stage for conflict that the leadership should manage using mainly management techniques. In a more general context, the ambiguous relationship between organisational outputs and international outcomes makes it difficult to determine the contribution to national security of all security sectors. This has to be seen as an area where perceptions and ideology may be as relevant as the actual data. Speaking about this issue, Valeri Ratchev¹²⁴ says that “measuring outputs is complicated by social, political, international and psychological factors”.

In summary, we can see that the defence management employs a vast set of working methods such as operational, system and structural analyses, planning and programming, modelling and simulation, creation of alternatives, measuring

¹²³ Ibidem 8, pg. 42
¹²⁴ Ibidem 9, pg9

performance and process improvement, project management, assessment of risks and many other methods and techniques applicable to different aspects of formulating and implementing a defence policy. This different management ways allow elaborating the differences among the notions of governance, management, administration, leadership and command, as well as of the role of civil-military relations in making the management of the defence organisation unique among all other state institutions and business organisations [Valeri Ratchev]. Thus, the detailed studies of defence management allow to set a proper context, as well as to enhance certain defence management mechanisms and the defence institution as a whole.

Defence Planning as Integral Component of Defence Policy Making

The US DoD Dictionary defines national policy as a “broad course of action or statements of guidance adopted by the government at the national level in pursuit of national objectives.”

Among the authoritative definitions of „policy,” the following two, provided in the Webster’s dictionary, are appropriate for our discourse:

1. A definite *course or method of action* selected from among alternatives and in light of given conditions to guide and determine present and future decisions.
2. A high level overall *plan* embracing the general goals and acceptable procedures esp. of a governmental body.¹²⁵

From this perspective I see that the good starting point in the discussion on defence policy is to clarify that the term *covers comprehensively ends* (what needs to be achieved), *ways* (how we intend to act) and *means* (with what we intend to achieve the ends)¹²⁶.

Regarding defence and military matters, two distinct tasks are determining:

1. how to use available means to reach desired ends, e.g., in the event of military aggression against the country; and
2. would the means allow that militaries to deal effectively with likely future threats and challenges.

The **first task** comprises *strategic* and *operational*, both *deliberate* and *contingency planning*, as well as command of troops in combat. It is often referred to as „*force employment*”.

The **second task** is a primary defence policy task. Although obvious, the premise that *defence policy* contains the definition of both *ends* and *means* is not easily understood and readily accepted everywhere, in particular in countries of the post-Soviet space. One reason is language.¹²⁷ In a number of languages, there is only

¹²⁵ ⁴ Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (Springfield, Mass.: Merriam Webster Inc., 1991). Emphasis added.

¹²⁶ Security and Defence Management Series no. 1, Cap 3, *Defence Planning – Core Processes in Defence Management*, pg 47

¹²⁷ ⁵ Certainly, not the most important one. Lack of civilian expertise, prevalent patterns of civilmilitary relations and a culture of secrecy, among others, also contribute to opaqueness and inefficiency of defence policies, planning,

one word—*politica*—that is used to translate both „policy” and „politics” and has strong connotations to everything „political.”¹²⁸ Therefore, a quite common perception is that defence policy is in the realm of the politicians, but the term is understood narrowly as decisions on the ends, i.e., setting the objectives that the armed forces must be able to attain.

On the other hand, and given the quite common lack of knowledge on military matters among politicians and their civilian staff *in post-totalitarian countries*, it that *only the military has the knowledge and the authority* to define what forces are needed in order to meet the objectives (understood also as „to implement the policy” as decided by politicians).

The purpose of defence planning, particularly long-term defence planning, is to define the means, including the future force structure (FS), that would allow defence institutions to deal effectively with likely future challenges. Thus, long-term defence planning is and should be examined as an integral component of defence policymaking¹²⁹.

Defence Planning Horizons

As all of us know very well, in most mature defence management systems it is possible to distinguish three planning horizons and their respective processes:

- Long-term planning
- Mid-term planning, often designated as programming
- Short-term planning.

In long-term defence planning, planners analyse trends in the evolution of the security environment, including threats and challenges, the role of alliances and their policies, and security and defence strategies.

From this perspective, I propose to see the role of each central structures of the Romanian MoND in these processes, because by analyzing these trends, they try to foresee defence requirements. In this sense, they have to asset the technology trends and the role of emerging technologies in novel ways of using the armed forces.

On this basis, they will define the future force structure of the RoAF, described by its main parameters (e.g., the number of manoeuvre brigades and battalions, air and naval squadrons). This force structure may be, sometimes, designated as a „vision,” of the armed forces in some future year. The concrete step made in direction, in our Armed Forces is *The Romanian Armed Forces Transformation Strategy*. In accordance with this rule, planners also have to define the main steps in the transition from the current to the future force structure. In accordance with the current methods used in the developed states, they have to ensure that both the

and plans. See Daniel Nelson, “Beyond Defense Planning,” in *Transparency in Defence Policy, Military Budgeting and Procurement*, ed. Todor Tagarev (Sofia: Geneva Centre for DCAF and George C. Marshall-Bulgaria, 2002).

¹²⁸ In the Slavic and Romance languages for example.

¹²⁹ Security and Defence Management Series no. 1, Todor Tagarev, Cap 3, *Defence Planning – Core Processes in Defence Management*, Ed. The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, pg. 49

future force structure and the transition to it need to be realistic. I mean that the decision makers and planners need to be fairly confident that the force and the transition will be sustainable under anticipated financial, technological, demographic and other important constraints. From this point of view, our national system has very strong methodology and very good specialist which performed the evaluation phase of the building the annual budget process

In this case the planning horizon exceeds the time necessary to develop the capabilities of the future force structure. Thus, we speak about a horizon of ten to fifteen years. Particularly, in the procurement system, it have to rely on of the weapon systems developed by someone else and accessible on the market. This is, in my view, the big challenges of the Arms Department, based on the concrete capabilities requirements established by the services. For this reason, our policy makers and planners examine Romanian foreign policy and security strategy, in attempts to analyse the way the world would look like in 2030, and their commitments with the Alliance and the relations with neighbours. All of these are the result of experience acquired by Romanian expert in defence planning and in defence procurement in the last ten years. The other main factor in this approach, in my opinion, is the Romanian technological ambitions and is willing to lead the development of new technologies that would eventually turn into new weapon systems 25 or 30 years in the future. In this estimation I have two main ideas. First is connected with the role of our national defence industries, which have to regain their main role in the development of the our national industry, based on the current trend and the Military Technical Academy, with their huge knowledge potential and the two great Romanian companies specialised in defence market. I mean here ROMTEHNICA and ROMARM which play the main role in defence procurements process developed by the Armed Forces. Another main player is The General Staff, the leader in the force structure design trough the capability design, and the DPQ and HGQ processes.

In connection with this long term defence planning, I agree the idea of the Todor Tagarev that says “while in long-term defence planning it is recommended to explore options that, theoretically, may have nothing in common with the current force structure, during midterm planning planners have to show very clearly how they provide for transition from the current force structure (FS) towards the future model of the armed forces. This underlines the view about what have to perform the strategic planning structure at the level of the General Staff and other central structures of the MoND.

For this reason, the mid-term plan, especially in its first years, reflects the resource constrains, because it is designed strictly within the expected resources and the defence budget forecast. In this respect, Tagarev says “many defence planning systems deal with this type of uncertainty through a roll-on mechanism of mid-term planning. New mid-term plans (or programmes) are designed annually or every other year, with the consequent short-term planning and implementation, thus allowing to steer force development towards the future model of the armed

forces”. In this way, he says, the connection between the current force structure and future force structure model can be as bellow (Figure 3)¹³⁰.




Figure 3 Linkages among Planning Horizons, Plans, and Implementation.

In this case, we can see that the future force structure model was adapted in accordance with the short-term plans and the implementation plans. In my opinion, to maintain this correlation is a main responsibility of the General Staff, through the Doctrine and Training Directorate.

Alternative Approaches to Long-term Defence Planning

The authoritative sources on defence planning present two approaches for long term planning¹³¹:

- The *top-down* approach – the interests, objectives and strategy drive the decisions on force structure.
- the *bottom-up* approach, the focus is on improvement of existing defence capabilities and related weapon systems – improvement aimed above all at meeting the requirements of current operations and operational plans.

From this perspective, for the Romanian planners the main approach, in my view, is not decided yet from the conceptual point of view. If their options go to the first, the main role to establish the model of the force structure belongs to the central structure of MoND – Defence Policy and Planning Department, General Staff and Arms Department. If the choice goes to the second, permanently the future model of the force structure will be not ready, all the efforts going on the improvement.

¹³⁰ Todor Tagarev, Defence Management: An Introduction, no 1, Chap. 2, *Defence Planning – Core Processes in Defence Management*, pg. 50

¹³¹ Todor Tagarev, Defence Management: An Introduction, *Defence Planning – Core Processes in Defence Management*, pag. 53

Speaking about the two options, in the Todor Tagarev view, “in two closely interrelated and complementary approaches, based respectively on threats and vulnerabilities assessment, planners seek the means to deal with the problem when both a threat and vulnerability against this country are identified. Capability requirements are defined in comparison to the capabilities of the prospective opponent. The other approaches used in long-term planning are the *core competencies and missions* approach, the *capability-based* approach, this which seek to obtain operational and strategic superiority through *technology* and the *fiscal* approach.

Finally, “... the *fiscal* approach to defence planning budget constraints drive the decisions on force structure”, Todor Tagarev says.

Linking Policy Objectives to Force Structure

The fundamental problem of the defence planning process is to ensure the linkage between the *policy objectives* and *force structure*. To uphold and promote the values and interests of a nation and the alliance, and, on the other hand, to underline security strategy and the role of the military among the instruments of national power are the main purposes of the elaboration of defence policy. In the most cases, the defence policy objectives are expressed as defence missions or as levels of ambitions (this way is presented in the figure bellow).

Defence ambitions

The main problem for the defence planners it is to receive from the political side the guidance regarding the level of ambitions in the defence area. These provide a realistic and specific formulation of the expectations regarding the roles of the armed forces, the operations they should be able to conduct on their own, with other militaries or with other security sector organisations, the quality of personnel, the technological level of the armed forces and the role of defence industry. Usually, these come from the governments, through the White Paper or from the President through the Security Strategy and establish, regarding the operations, the number, scale and nature of operations that a country should be able to conduct – the “operational tempo”. These establish, also, the number of sizeable, ongoing deployments to multiple theatres. In this respect, let see a few examples:

NATO’s level of ambitions, till 2006, states that The Alliance had to able *to conduct three major joint operations*, out of the territory. Staring with 2006 Ministerial Guidance, NATO set a new level of ambition – to be “able to conduct a greater number of smaller-scale operations ... than in the past” while retaining “its ability to carry out larger operations”.¹³²

U.K., in its current Defence White Paper, defines the following level of ambition:

¹³² “NATO Sets New Level of Ambition for Operations,” *NATO Update* (8 June 2008), www.nato.int/docu/update/2006/06-june/e0608b.htm.

- three concurrent operations, one of which is an enduring peace support operation
- limited national operations
- be the lead, or framework nation for coalition operations, at small to medium scale
- the capacity to undertake Large Scale operation.
- For France, the defence ambitions, presented in Programme Low 2003-2008, in the main, aim:
 - to protect autonomy of decision and action (including the ability to act alone should it be necessary);
 - to have sufficient military capabilities to contribute to a spectrum of military actions (especially in high intensity operations);
 - maintain the “necessary technological know-how to ensure, through time, the credibility of nuclear deterrence.

From Defence Objectives to Capabilities

Finally, I want to underline that this approach aim no the forces but the capabilities that its have or will have via a vis to defence objectives. The link between objectives and capabilities define the capabilities necessary to achieve the objectives. Its belong on the situations, or scenarios, in which the armed forces might be used, and accounts for the way in which they will be used (figure 4).

The planners” community has accepted that the scenarios describe potential missions, based on challenges or threats faced in a 10-20 year time frame, comparable with the time necessary to reshape force structures, develop and field corresponding weapon systems. Till now, when we speak about the time frame, the Romanian defence planers” vision is not so clear, such as not clear are and the levels of ambition of the political leaders. Namely, the Romanian defence planers document (i.e White Paper) don”t have a clear political view about the how many joint operations have to able to led or to participate RoAR, what type can be these operations (large, medium or small) or it shall be possible to undertake some operations with little prior warning and to sustain other operations over a longer period of time.

For this reason, “policy makers and planners need to consider multiple scenarios in order to address the complex nature of military missions and to select a set of scenarios. The set should be representative of the security challenges outlined in the defence policy, say Todor Tagarev¹³³, adding that the “scenario selection is a critical activity”. In this respect, the selected scenarios need to capture the full spectrum of missions, operations, and the range of objectives and interests. Its must be credible so that the resulting plans would be acceptable.

¹³³ Ibidem 9, pg 64

The selected scenarios lead directly policy makers and defence planners to perform particular tasks¹³⁴ that have to be performed in operations. These tasks define the types of capabilities needed to accomplish the tasks (or to achieve desired effects). For the planers, the main important problem is, finally, to make sure that they will provide a “cost-efficient force packages”¹³⁵. The capability set should be robust against the set of plausible scenarios




Figure 4 Definition of Defence Objectives

Force Structure and Financial Constraints

In the current approach, mainly in this crisis period, that demands always exceed the available resource. Thus, for the Policy makers and planners distinguish four related types of risks¹³⁶: (1) operational, (2) future challenges, (3) force management and (4) institutional risks.

In the current procedure of the policy makers and the defence planners a main tool is the *Bartlett model*¹³⁷ (figure 5).

¹³⁴ For example, Canadian defence policy makers and planners use, among other documents, the “Canadian Joint Task List” as a “common lexicon ... for capability planning.” The U.S. force planning system, the set of tasks that results from analysing the scenario set for each mission is referred to as “Mission EssentialTask List.”

¹³⁵ Ibidem 9, pg 66

¹³⁶ Ibidem 9, pg. 68

¹³⁷ Ibidem 9, pg 67




Figure 5 Bartlett Model of Strategic Development.

When planners have to find a force structure that is „realistic,” i.e., that could be built and sustained within expected budgets (Budget 2 level in figure 6), they create plans for a force structure associated with Risk 2.




Figure 6: Force Structures, Risk and Budget Levels.

Practical, this mismatch between needs, is inevitable and creates a gap of *unfunded* capabilities. The defence planning theory has a lot of aspect about what can we do with this gap, but in current practice, very strong determinate by the crisis constrains, the most of the defence budget cutting lead to reduce many endowment programs, or cancellation them (i.e. the American Army Future Combat Systems, the F-35 JSF; British Modernisation Program for Land Forces).

Many opinions are now about the Force Structure and budget, but one is very important: a force structure may be accepted if it is affordable and the associated

planning risk is acceptable¹³⁸. In this approach, the *risk assessment* is very important and so important to, a standard solution isn't, this belonging with the way which the people have or not risk adverse – any people has, more willing to accept risk („risk prone”¹³⁹), others no.

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* *

Instead of conclusion, I want to underline two issues that have a strong connection with the defence planning in the current period, and mainly, with the course of this process in RoAF, in my view.

The first issue is the *context for the planning process*. For us, like EU and NATO members, the defence planning process has to respond with the both commitments. Like NATO member, the Romanian force planning process goes cohesively with the NATO process, and our force structure tries to respond to our commitments with the Alliance. As EU member, the issue is more complicated, because and the EU process is at the beginning, and for Romania, this started in the very difficult condition – an important economic decrease and an unachieved transformation process of the armed forces – unintergated weapon systems and C2, unapproved endowment program and the Implementation Program of the Transformation Strategy which does not reflect the forces proposal accepted by Romania with NATO in 2008.

The second issue is the *specialisation*. In my view, this issue is very suitable with the small states, which have to decide the kind of their contribution to the efforts of the alliances those they belong. Between the *specialisation* and *niche* capability is a very strong relation; the second may provide high-value contributions to collective security. A decision on capability specialisation, in this case, belongs to the national security authorities and also may provide economies of scale.

As I mention, there is no algorithm for the application of scenario-based capability-oriented defence planning, but very important remain the steps that drive the creation of force structure and force development plans, and, in the some time, can drive the defence planning structure reorganisation, to become more agile and flexible in the context of the networking and globalisation process. They are:

- definition of defence objectives, missions, and ambitions by the political side;
- design and agree on plausible scenarios, or environments in which will be developed the planning process;
- to carry out of the missions (often including development of adequate operational concepts and selection of „course of action”);
- decomposition of scenario activities into tasks and definition of „mission – essential task lists” (tasks are often drawn from generic task lists).
- design of a force structure appropriate for all anticipated missions and scenarios.

¹³⁸ Ibidem 9, pg. 69

¹³⁹ Ibidem 16

- Hence, the definition of the capabilities needed to accomplish the tasks. This step includes a number of sub-steps, the latter two performed in iteration:
 - definition of the needed types of capabilities
 - assessment of planning risks
 - design of a cost-effective force package that would provide capability
 - levels needed to accomplish the tasks with acceptable risk

The community defence planners accepted that these steps may be performed in a variety of ways. What is important is to adhere to a rational, disciplined approach to defence planning and to accept that the principles of transparency and accountability are fundamental in the process as we see in the current practice of the strong democracies, our present partners in the political and security alliances.