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## **HUMAN RESOURCES AND THE OBJECTIVE CIVILIAN CONTROL**

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### **Abstract:**

Increase of the militaries' professionalism is, according to the Samuel P. Huntington writings, the way to achieve objective civil control, meaning the way to assure political neutrality of the officers. It is essential for this professionalism to be clearly defined in order to avoid transforming it into a dead word, an empty box, repeated constantly during the official meetings.

This paper is introducing a view on the military profession in Romania, noticing significant differences between the theories promoted by different famous authors, the related official documents and the actual perception of certain active officers on this concept. The necessity of a serious analysis regarding the characteristics of the military professionalism is outlined aiming to achieve the civil objective control.

### **1. Introduction**

According to national strategic planning documents, Romania will have a fully professionalized army. The National Security Strategy of Romania [1] describes our country's military future: *"Romania aims to create a modern army, fully professionalized, adequately sized and equipped with mobile and versatile expeditionary force, rapidly deployable, flexible and efficient, capable of defending the credibility of the national territory, to fulfill the collective defense and participation in international missions in accordance with the priorities and requirements of foreign and security policy."* In turn, the Romanian Armed Forces' Transformation Strategy [2] states that *"the Romanian Army Transformation general aims achieve a modern structure, completely **professionalized**, with a high degree of mobility, efficient, flexible, deployable, sustainable, meeting the capacity to act and be engaged in a wide range of missions, both on the national territory and beyond it"*. We further try to explain what is meant by the professionalism, so important for ensuring an objective civilian control, according to Samuel Huntington's view. At the same time, point out obvious link between professionalization and human resources, the most important resources in the field of security and defense, as well.

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## **2. Professionalism and civilian control**

Do we really talk about a delicate subject? Is it a concept which prioritizes arbitrarily different segments of the society? Trying to isolate a significant part of the population, setting the limits of action and participation embarrassing? The answer is clearly NO. All democracies practice such control. Even democratic countries practice "kind" of civilian control over the military or the military. But try to describe as simple concept, especially considering that Samuel P. Huntington, one of the most important theorists of civil-military relations, says that "*this concept (civilian control – authors note) has never been defined in satisfactorily or*"[3].

Civilian control over the military is quasi-general answer to the question: *who runs the state - politicians or military commanders?* Surely the first question was put by human society since the state realized the advantages of peace and social compromise with the state of war and excessive discipline that restricts freedom of every individual. And this time was not as close today as we might think, and the handful example is given by the caste hierarchy in ancient India, no longer than four millennia ago. It is well known that Brahmins were at the top of the hierarchy, followed by the military and judges, craftsmen and servants, workers. Indian Army, so to speak, was controlled by "*civilians*" in high places. But we decided not to do a history of civilian control over the military and we will limit ourselves to modern times. In the latter part of the eighteenth century, "*U.S. founding fathers*" were reluctant to the existence of a regular army, which could use force to impose their will, other than citizens. In other words, maintaining an institution designed to protect the nation, you expose yourself to the danger of being attacked by it when that institution considers that there is legitimacy and opportunity. This attitude, enriched by the idea of multiple control (the separate powers - executive, legislative and judicial), gave birth to the idea that it appeared the concept of civilian control over the military, even if its application be held from immemorial time.

Simplified crucial decision on defense issues belong civilians (politicians) and, equally, and responsibility lies about it to those decisions. It seems the essence of the concept of civilian control, politician's nomination is a direct consequence of the rules of modern democracies and the society is represented in decision-making by politicians. We add here that, not an institution or organization able to support them (obviously put brackets medieval Tartar hordes and other similar forces), military spending public money obtained from civilian contributors, distributing money through legitimate representatives of the citizens, must therefore be subject to scrutiny.

It is considered one of the basic features of a liberal democracy the very stable civilian control over the military. This does not mean that there is no civilian control other than traditional democracies. Mao, for example, declared that "*Our principle is that the Party leads the army and the army will never be allowed to lead the Party.*" It is about to discuss to which extent the Chinese Communist Party resembled more of a civil than a military organization, but amid his words are found in many other countries, including Romania, and we believe that it is a type of civilian control.

We return to Huntington, which assumes that essentially seeks to minimize civilian control of the military power against civilians and believes that there are two types of civilian control: subjective civilian control and objective civilian control. If the first tries to

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maximize civilian power, the second is based on maximizing the professionalization of the soldiers, so that their interest in political involvement to be minimal.

Subjective political control required by various political groups eager to maximize their power in military matters and involves progressive involvement of the military in politics, denial of the existence of an independent military sphere. Problem that reduces the stability and effectiveness of subjective civil groups is due to the diversity of interests, diversity preventing maximize their power as a whole. Huntington argues that, in fact, the civil power maximization means maximizing the power of a group or several groups of civil case that results in major changes under changing balance of political power. Thus, civilian control becomes more of a slogan of those groups who want to increase their power over other groups. Historically, subjective civilian control was achieved by maximizing the executive power, the ruling social class or by constitutional means.

This leads to objective civilian control of military power by minimizing the professionalization of the army which, according to the American theorist becomes "*sterile and politically neutral*". Assumption of this approach is that the recognition of autonomous military professionalism leads to decreased political power of the military provided preserving elements of power required for the existence of the military profession. Huntington points out that, since the maximum professionalism to achieve any reduction of military power beyond the limits set are actually promoting civil group, then return to subjective control. Despite the advantages offered by the control objective nor modern Western societies could not provide such a high level of civilian control. The situation is due to the tendency of many civil groups to advocate for their interests and military subordination principles, even while the "*subjective civilian control is fundamentally excluded in any society where, through the division of labor was a separate category management specialists in violence*".

### **3. The civil control in Romania**

We think to make assessments on existing civilian control type in our country or the level of any objective review and not believe that such assessments have their place here. However, such an undertaking requires serious research, currently not seem very interesting to those entitled to ask. As far as we are concerned, we have long way to clarify the content of the military profession, so to set those limits necessary political power objective civilian control. Moreover, following such a path, you must first clarify basic concepts such as defense or military. On the other hand, we cannot fall into the trap of treating the subject "diplomatically", triumphantly repeating that everything is fine since we are members of NATO.

Therefore, we describe how civilian control is achieved in Romania today, from those civil institutions which make major decisions regarding the military. It is known that the fundamental law [4] contains an article that stands army serving the people, "*the Army is subject solely to the will of the people to safeguard the sovereignty, independence and unity of the state, territorial integrity and constitutional democracy.*" Moreover, "*Parliament is the supreme representative body of the Romanian people and the sole legislative authority of the country*". Obviously, relating the two provisions, the first institution exercising civilian control is the Parliament. Besides adopt legislation on the field, the Parliament has powers such as declaring total or partial mobilization, declaration of war, suspend or terminate military hostilities; approval of the

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country's national defense strategy, examine reports of the Supreme Council of National Defence, specified in the text of the Constitution.

As a component of the state, it is obvious that the military is civilian controlled by the President. The Constitution states that "*The President of Romania represents the Romanian state and is the guarantor of national independence, unity and territorial integrity of the country*" but also lists its main tasks in the area of defense: "*(1) Romanian President is the Commander of the Armed Forces and President of the Supreme Defence Council. (2) He may declare, with the prior approval of Parliament, partial or total mobilization of the armed forces. Only in exceptional cases, the decision of the President is subsequently submitted to Parliament for approval, within 5 days after adoption. (3) In the event of armed aggression against the country, the President of Romania shall take measures to repel aggression and bring them immediately to inform Parliament with a message. If Parliament is not in session, it shall be convened as within 24 hours of the onset of aggression. (4) In the event of mobilization or war, the Parliament shall continue for the duration of these conditions, and if not in session shall be convened as 24 hours from declaring them*".

The first paragraph of Article quote shows another important institution of exercising civil control: Supreme Council of National Defense. In fact, its existence is devoted to an article of the Basic Law: "*Supreme Defence Council unitarily organizes and coordinate the activities concerning national defense and security, participation in maintaining international security and collective defense in military alliance systems, and actions to maintain or restore peace.*" At this point, we consider it necessary to emphasize the SCND's role on defense, and for this it is sufficient to present his powers, as they mentioned in the law on the organization and functioning. Also here we can raise the issue regarding the discretion of the adjective "major" in describing the concept of civilian control.

The Government is exercising the civilian control of the military, under its powers given by the Constitution: "*The Government, according to its government program accepted by Parliament, carries out the country's domestic and foreign policy and oversees public administration*". From the perspective of policy fulfillment of alliances and partnerships, leverage civilian control is important, possible and at the direct coordination, intergovernmental and inter-institutional. There is a pin that the Secretary of Defense or the Department of Defense Policy and Planning of the Ministry of Defence would exert civilian control over the military. We cannot agree with such a statement as corroborating existing laws means that there is equivalence between the army and the defense ministry. Some authors [5] believe that some state institutions (Court of Auditors, the Ombudsman, prosecutors and courts) exercises, in turn, civilian control over the military. Our view is that these institutions are not relevant to the topic discussed by us. On the other hand, we believe that the work of NGOs, media, private research institutes in the field, can help increase the effectiveness of civilian control over the military but does not exercise such control.

### **4. Professionalizing our Army**

On the military profession, discussions can become endless when it comes to our Army. For many, many years, what Huntington called the officer corps, that those people

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who are soldiers for an indefinite period, is, in our view, a genuine professional entity, meaning that cultural differences between civil eminently professional groups (teachers, doctors, lawyers, etc..) and the body are insignificant. Romanian troops generally live outside military bases, have a normally working program, like civilians, their families are not depending on the Army, so the main characteristics of the U.S. non-professional military are missing. The only major change is the abandonment of conscription based recruitment, and here is noticed as volunteers are, in fact, an extension of the officer corps. Thus, the dilemma given the fundamental question of modern military - is an institution or an occupational profession? - do not wake up in Romania, the same controversy as overseas. This is quite notorious the military is an occupational profession like all the other professions. The reflection as an institution exists, but it is only the meaning of the word used equally for school, court, hospital, ministry or government, that is a public benefit organization funded by the taxpayer in providing services.

What is the essence of this profession? Charles Moskos describes it in "smoother terms" than other authors (the management of violence): "The armed forces are invested by the nations with responsibilities hard to find in the civilian life, if not ever - defending the national interest, having a real possibility that members of the military to risk their lives in this role and, in recent years, the paramount responsibility of conducting and supervising nuclear arsenal". We appreciate, of course, the permanent concern of American author for the virtues of the institutional culture, but our view is quite trenchant. The essence of the military profession, to use force to fulfill the tasks entrusted, is made according to established procedures. In other words, we insist that employment scheme should be limited to purely military occupations, avoiding civilian ones such as those of accountants, financiers, teachers, waiters, drivers etc. Soldiers are infantrymen, tank operators, engineers, sailors, airmen ... all those people prepared to use force to carry out tasks related to the responsibilities specified by Moskos. If we look at it this way, we can say that we have a long way to full professionalization of the Army.

The biggest problem is linked to the professionalization of the Army recruitment, it is obvious that such a profession requires specific native qualities as well as the military profession. Given the special difficulties of selecting soldiers in a short period of time, we believe that the solution lies in creating a differentiated career advancement mechanism to motivate additional skilled recruits' before those with general skills. Effectively ensuring a professional fair career would lead, to our opinion, and to the attractiveness of the profession, avoiding the current situation (existing and other meridians), that the number and structure of the volunteers depends almost exclusively of the general labor market.

### **5. A few statistics on human resources in the military**

It is obvious that the effectiveness of an army is achieved through substantial financial efforts, both for military reasons, but mostly to ensure all the components of a military capability. Besides general limitation of resources, Romania is not one of the European economic performers and financial resources allocated for defense are not and cannot be according to the measurable objectives.

In the following, we present some statistics regarding the expenditure Romania dedicated in 2010, so at the beginning of the global financial crisis. The data is taken from the EU statistics and comparisons we are interested in are primarily related to former communist European countries: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary,

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Poland, the Baltic countries. Of data provided by EDA portal, we especially chose those related to the percentage of GDP allocated to defense, the number of military personnel, civilian and cumulative in the defense systems, the average volume of investments depending on the number and the amount of personnel expenses.

In order not to be misunderstood, point out that, despite their importance, the defense funds are not sufficient to figure the effectiveness of an Army, even though this paper advocates intelligent use of available resources, especially for minimizing waste. Because waste is to maintain troops which will never fight, being unable to fight due to lack of skills and training, waste is an attempt to reproduce the entire (the Romanian society) in one specialized segment of his (military), especially given the endeavor of full professionalization, to achieve objective civilian control.

On the other hand, it is clear that underfunding defense system jeopardizes major performance objectives. Moreover, simultaneous maintenance of multiple objectives that cannot be financed put pressure on the other, reducing the effectiveness of the entire system.

Table 1 presents information taken from EDA statistics for 2009.

		<b>% Of GDP</b>	<b>Military</b>	<b>Civilians</b>	<b>Staff</b>	<b>Investment / Military</b>	<b>Costs personal</b>
		<i>%</i>	<i>person</i>	<i>person</i>	<i>person</i>	<i>EUR</i>	<i>million</i>
<b>Romania</b>	<b>EN</b>	<b>1.2 9%</b>	<b>68340</b>	<b>12789</b>	<b>81129</b>	<b>1,775</b>	<b>1,182</b>
Austria	AUT	0.86%	29533	9,030	38563	10524	1,608
Belgium	BEL	1. 12%	34156	2,073	36229	7,759	3,003
Bulgaria	BG	1. 74%	29803	8,470	38273	3,250	404
Cyprus	CYP	2.06%	12249	785	1303 4	5,862	236
Czech Republic	CZE	1. 39%	23186	8,782	31968	8,463	986
Estonia	EST	1. 72%	3,209	1,032	4,541	18127	75
Finland	FIN	1.50%	36479	6,682	43161	20186	789
France	FR	2.01%	233600	67500	3 011 00	50736	7,466
Germany	GER	1. 34%	246 244	30984	277228	28884	17835
Greece	GRE	2. 07%	124266	10601	134867	9,240	2,489
Hungary	HUN	1.04%	21196	3,653	24849	5,831	576
Italy	IT	1.40%	191231	30479	22171 0	16424	16245
Ireland	IRE	0.59%	9,550	730	10280	8,836	685
Latvia	LET	1. 08%	4,763	1,288	6,051	5,017	97
Lithuania	LIT	0.90%	7,922	2,164	10086	7,992	161
Luxembourg	LUX	0.47%	882	130	1,012	77241	84
Malta	MLT	0.71%	2,174	116	2,290	996	34
Netherlands	NL	1.4 3%	47660	14509	62169	30411	4,282
Poland	POL	1. 81%	97170	46280	143 45 0	16018	3,357
Portugal	ROP	1.61%	38927	7,336	46263	7,607	1,952
Slovakia	SVK	1.29%	14204	6,949	21253	5,932	504
Slovenia	SLO	1.62%	7,053	1,443	8,496	15978	359
Spain	ESP	1.05%	129723	26093	155816	11004	7,055
Sweden	SWE	1. 23%	14357	6,761	21118	79595	1,236
United Kingdom	UK	2.56%	192300	83060	2753 60	58960	14724

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## **1. Table 1: Statistics on employment EDA**

It can be seen that despite an important number of military and civilian personnel meant for defense, share of GDP is below the European average, but without looking very small. On the other hand, if we add the fact that he is, for years, constantly decreasing, and that the GDP per capita is very low in Romania, we can deduce that the evolution of defense funding is inadequate and does not actually allow reducing the gaps with the Allies. Figure 1 shows the position of this indicator in those countries.




Fig.1. Percentage of GDP allocated for defense

A second indicator that seems interesting is related to investments made for each soldier. This time, Malta is on the last place, but penultimate is Romania, where the investments per soldier are approximately twelve times lower than the European average. We view this situation, given the same countries as in the previous figure.




Fig.2. Investment volume and the number of staff

As can be seen, the position of the indicator is particularly critical in the group, its value being significantly lower in Romania than in other states.

Finally we seem relevant an indicator referring on personnel costs related to the number of soldiers and civilians in the system. As can be seen here, Romania, alongside with Bulgaria, has the lowest volume related to the number of personnel.

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


Fig.3. Staff costs per employee (EUR / person)

### 5. Conclusion

Full professionalization of the Romanian Army can be discussed from multiple viewpoints. If we see the professionalization exclusively as recognition of the military profession, equivalent to the civilian occupations, we can say that it is already professionalized. If we consider, however, that this profession requires skills and exercise its powers effectively, things are not good.

It is imperative a system of recruitment and career advancement greatly improved and a proper sizing of the available resources, including for the financial components, and in spite of its positive image within and outside the country, the Romanian Army needs new efforts to be effective and efficient. Given that the additional allocation would not be expected, we believe it is necessary to prioritize and restructure the objectives and the system, so partners gaps to not become an insurmountable problem.

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