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PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN DEFENCE STRATEGY

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Abstract:

The security of the European Union (EU) requires a holistic, strategic civil-military vision that combines achievable means and ends.

Military defence is just a small part of the effort and military power should be oriented to enforce wider security responsibilities.

The European Security Strategy (ESS) upon which this strategy is based is a pre-strategic concept that must be converted into a mechanism that defines when, where, why and how the European Union will act.

Such a strategic concept can generate the instrument that will weld all the EU's security tools (aid and development, prevention of strategic intrusion by terrorists, robust policing and armed forces) into the single institutional framework that contemporary security demands.

Key words: strategic concept, institutional framework, security demands.

1. Introduction

The Venusberg Strategy 2004 calls upon EU member-states to rapidly harden the European Security Strategy into a European Strategic Concept, which would represent a new departure in transnational security thinking and organization.

European Security Strategy as a conceptual must be translated into security and defence missions with a detailed military task list developed thereafter that would form the basis for a strategic European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

The strategic ESDP military task list will provide the framework for European force transformation, integration of European armed forces, planning for future missions, equipment programmes and defence financing requirements.

As a long term provision, the EU should be in a position to undertake all ESS-type missions at their most demanding by 2015.

2. ESDP Strategy

The security and defence missions implied in the European Security Strategy (ESS) call for the development of a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) that carries out a far broader range of missions than currently envisaged, over far greater distance, at

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potentially higher levels of conflict intensity and for longer periods. A strategic ESDP is essential to the achievement of the ESS.

2.1 Objectives inside Strategic ESDP

1. Secure external borders of the EU and strengthened co-operation under the Schengen Agreement. Political consolidation, due to EU enlargement and emerging threats.

2. The ESS must be rapidly consolidated into a European strategic concept that will formalise when, why, where and how the EU will act.

3. Military missions requested by the ESS suggest the need for European armed forces to operate at a large scale, possibly anywhere in the world.

4. An EU Security Council (EUSC) should be established incorporating the Political and Security Committee (PSC) with main role to balance security with political legitimacy. The EUSC would be responsible for both military and civilian security and in time the defence of the Union. The EUSC will be co-chaired permanently by EU Foreign and Security Ministers. During a crisis, the Council will retain overall strategic direction, with control of EU operations under the EUSC. Military operational leadership will be the responsibility of a trirectoire of Britain, France and Germany prior to the establishment of an EU Permanent, Combined and Joint Headquarters (EUPCJHQ).

5. Create an EU Counter-Terrorism Co-ordinator, an EU Homeland Security Agency (EUHSA) under the direct control of the EUSC and headed by a new EU Security Minister. Inside EU Homeland Security Agency should be an EU Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Agency (EUCTIA).

6. Creating a new common defence strategy to protect European critical infrastructure (power, food, health, IT and transportation systems).

7. The missions in the ESS will require military task list of EU armed forces over the next ten years.

8. Professionalisation of EU forces, together with the harmonisation of language, training, exercising and doctrine.

2.2 NATO - EU relationship based on ESDP

The EU-NATO relationship must build through a strategic dialogue that confirms the roles and functions of the two organisations, supported by political and operational transparency to ensure effective cohesion and co-ordination. The commitment to create in time an EU-NATO Operational Planning and Command Centre (EUNOPS) that would eventually replace SHAPE would provide a focus for the strategic dialogue.

European forces must develop a degree of 'co-operability' with US armed forces, with flexible command and control in order to provide European forces access into US networks.

A reformed NATO will remain platform for the projection of European, higher-intensity military capability worldwide.

Senior officers of non-NATO, EU countries or countries that are not within the integrated military structure (IMS) of the Alliance must be able to assume command of EU-led operations using NATO assets. This reinforces the need for a strong EU planning and command capability at SHAPE.

At the political level a reformed NATO will remain an important forum for transatlantic policy co-ordination. The Alliance must also retain its Article 5 mission, which because of American presence will be essential to prevent defence re-nationalisation, particularly in Eastern Europe.

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A reformed NATO must also be re-structured to better enable it to manage the consequences of inevitable and unavoidable differences in US and European strategic perceptions and policy by bridging the gaps in force structure and capabilities that result from such differing policy perceptions.

2.3 Capabilities required to fill gaps between the ESS and the ESDP

Strategic ESDP missions will be organised through coalitions, with EU assuming responsibilities of a coalition leader.

The ESS must become the strategic benchmark for European defence planning. Europeans must therefore use the ESS to close the gap between Europe's strategic environment and its security and defence capabilities.

Number of missions and tasks must be further widened.

Peacemaking and peacekeeping doctrine that provides a common base not just for operations, but also other military software, such as training, and procurement.

The need for rapid and marked improvement in European military effectiveness emphasises the need for a distinct European Force Transformation Concept that merges some American-style concepts for electronically 'joined up' forces with European experience.

A European Network Enabling Capability (ENEC) is needed to electronically integrate European forces and improve both their strategic 'eyes' and 'ears'. Such a capability will need to be developed within the framework of a European Force Transformation Concept tailored specifically to European needs. Necessarily, European forces will operate at lower levels of situational awareness and with forces less networked than their American counterparts.

The ENEC will enable linkages between European forces rather than provide a single advanced network. In this respect, the ENEC would need to be developed in parallel with a specifically European interoperability concept to ensure European interoperability dominance over all operations likely to be generated by the European Security Strategy.

Europeans must press the United States to consider new thinking on traditional peacekeeping and new warfighting/peacemaking transitional conflict evident in Iraq in its transformation concept.

As EU forces find themselves deployed on ever higher intensity missions, planning and command of flexible coalitions will need to be formalised. The robust development of EU planning and command cells at both SHAPE and the EU Military Staff (EUMS) into NATO-compatible headquarters will ensure autonomous EU control over medium to high-intensity operations.

European strategic self-confidence will only be realised when Europe has sufficient strategic eyes and ears. Europeans will only act promptly and in a determined manner when they are sure that they control both the quality and flow of strategic intelligence. Some duplication with US and NATO assets and capabilities is both essential and unavoidable.

To problems associated with the generation and management of variable coalitions undertaking variable ESS-missions, the EU needs its own EU Force Generation Database (EUF GD) of available forces. Such a database will support what in time will become an EU Permanent Combined and Joint Headquarters (EUPCJHQ).

The EU Force Generation Database will need to include those forces on non-EU member-states allocated (or that could be allocated) through the Committee of Contributors system.

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A particularly important role for EUPCJHQ will be to familiarise officers from non EU-NATO members and non-EU partner states with EU multinational coalition operations at all levels of intensity.

In spite of the differences that emerged in 2003 there is no point in the EU developing entirely new warfighting doctrine and methods of co-operability and interoperability at higher levels of mission intensity that would reduce the ability of EU forces to work with US armed forces. That is unless US force transformation leaves Europeans with no other option.

The European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) and the NATO Response Force (NRF) must be developed in parallel so that they are interchangeable at different levels of conflict intensity. Each force must be designed to augment and/or follow-on the other if overall command between the EU and NATO changes during a crisis.

In the interim between EU coalition management and defence integration the military leadership by the major Europeans will be essential. Smaller states must become specialised and organized around an autonomous EU planning and command capability.

Given the extensive military infrastructure autonomous high-end capabilities require (and prior to the establishment of EUNOPS), Europeans should work through SHAPE to ensure escalation dominance over military operations involving complex European coalitions engaged on medium to high intensity operations. For less robust operations they can rely on national headquarters of the larger European states and in time the EUPCJHQ.

The ESS implies the need for an EU Strategic Defence Planning Concept (EUSDPC) essential for the harmonisation and co-ordination of the defence planning cycles of EU member-states based upon the elaborated military task list of the ESS.

A limited European C4ISR capability will be required to support the European Network Enabling Concept. The inclusion of the European C4ISR network into the EU-NATO Operational Planning and Command Centre (that would be physically located at SHAPE in Mons, Belgium) would enhance the Union's political and operational autonomy and ensure transparency between the two organisations.

In addition to limited strategic intelligence satellites and other air-breathing systems (such as global reach unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)), advanced communications and effective ground surveillance (C4ISR), EU forces need effective suppression of enemy air defences (SEAD), offensive electronic warfare (OEW) capabilities, fast strategic lift (air and sea), force protection capabilities, and precision-guided munitions (PGMs). The European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) and the Prague Capabilities Commitments must be harmonised, co-ordinated and strengthened to ensure fulfilment of vital capability goals.

Europeans need to enhance battlefield intelligence using Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, improved identification of friend or foe (IFF) through improved digitised radar surveillance of the battlespace and personalised advanced surveillance technologies for individual combat troops. Such capabilities should be included within an ECAP re-configured to meet the needs of a strategic ESDP.

Despite of the fact that European Special Forces have proved themselves particularly effective and adaptable, their training and doctrine makes it difficult for them to operate effectively with each other. A combined EU-NATO Special Forces Training Concept and Programme would significantly enhance their ability to operate together.

Combat troops do not make good police officers. Gendarmerie, Guardia Civil and Carabinieri-type forces that can bridge the gap between combat soldiering and policing

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will be essential for the reconstruction of societies in the immediate post-conflict phase and the re-establishment of norms of civil society. The French proposal to establish a European Gendarmerie Force is therefore to be welcomed and strengthened. The EU needs a force of at least 10,000 'European Gendarmes' directly answerable to it.

The EU must also develop specialists in the reconstruction of infrastructure, such as sewage systems, electrical and water supply, health services, as well as better co-ordinated policy and implementation with non-governmental organisations (NGOs). It must be integrated into overall EU civil-military crisis management planning and co-ordinated through the EU crisis management system.

The needs of the EU as a holistic security actor will highlight the vital contribution made by the European Commission as a channel for what are essentially civilian skills and capabilities into overall crisis management planning and implementation.

2.4 Support for Strategic ESDP

The EU Satellite Interpretation Centre at Torrejon will become an invaluable support for the command chain. In the interim greater utilisation of open and commercial information sources, particularly in support of lower intensity peace operations, need to be explored. Civilian technology is available, advanced and flexible.

Europe's developing high-speed rail network must be better employed to move EU forces rapidly in support of EU operations, either adjacent to a theatre (such as the Adriatic coast of Italy) or to a port (UK forces from southern England to Marseilles, for example).

The EU must also explore the feasibility of legally requisitioning ships of member-states for service during a time of crisis by adapting European law to enable the use of ships under flag to EU member-states.

An EU Joint Intelligence Committee (EJIC) working directly into the office of the EU Security Minister will help to co-ordinate and safeguard shared intelligence, staffed by national intelligence officers who will process and evaluate raw intelligence, supported by national intelligence agencies.

In time the proposed European Security and Defence College (ESDC) will be the logical place to develop command language, doctrine and training expertise and harmonization. In the interim existing national resources should be harmonized and co-ordinated.

The political base of any European force is essential, because it is vital that a strong constituency of European public opinion supports both the concept of European defence and the operations implied by the ESS.

A parallel public information campaign is needed that both informs and involves European public opinion. It is inconceivable that a strategic ESDP can develop without the active support and commitment of European citizens.

The nature of contemporary security also raises fears about excessive intrusion by security agencies, a degree of which is inevitable in an age of strategic terror. Protection against overintrusion would be improved by the appointment of a European Security Ombudsman closely linked to the European Court of Justice (ECJ).

Use of the wider academic and policy community is critical to effective strategic clarity and planning. EU agencies such as the EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) must be more closely involved with longer-term forecasting in support of the Policy Planning Unit of the Council Secretariat. In particular, EUISS should act as a focal point for the better use of Europe's academic community in support of EU security planning.

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3. ESDP Strategy Major Requirements

Once a European strategic concept is in place and it becomes clear what will be expected of European forces, European defence procurement will need to become more like that of a single state, in which the only debate that matters is that between strategy and the needs of Europe's land, sea and air forces.

The European common defence market, supported by a common Research & Technology budget and co-ordinated through a strong European Defence Agency (EDA) would undoubtedly improve cost-effectiveness for European armed forces undergoing transformation.

The need for a single European defence market is self-evident. If the US follows a 'Buy American First' strategy, the EU must adopt a 'Buy European First' strategy to safeguard procurement for European armed forces. Securing Europe's autonomous supply of advanced military technology and equipment (and its re-supply) is a pre-requisite for a strategic ESDP. However, it may be cheaper on occasions to buy American, particularly if they alone have the technology required.

In the longer run the EU will need a strategic EU Defence Research and Technology Development Fund (EUDRTDF) for the development of 'big ticket' common security and defence items.

The European Defence Agency must prompt member-states to better promote convergence of military requirements to complex approach to armaments co-operation. A first step will be to provide an easier and more effective transfer of defence technology and equipment between EU member-states, as well as the exchange of sensitive information and technologies, joint research and development.

For the EU to develop forces able to fulfil ESS-type missions will require that all EU memberstates spend a minimum of 2% GDP per annum on defence. At least 10% of respective national defence budgets must be earmarked for transformation projects.

European governments will only overcome the ever increasing unit cost of equipment, research and development associated with the digitisation of future conflict and the switch from platforms to systems essential to transformation through significant, pooled defence financing.

Whilst modest real increases in European defence budgets are essential, existing defence resources must be used more effectively. Too many defence resources are wasted through duplicated infrastructure, redundant fixed assets and duplication of effort in non-essential areas.

A Defence Business Affairs Programme (DBAP) would transfer best practice from the commercial sector, including the use of commercial techniques, such as outsourcing of non-core activities, leasing of equipment and just-in-time/focused logistics. Such an approach would build on experience gained around Europe in smart procurement and financing programmes.

A new analysis of defence financing techniques is required. Too many programmes are cut or shelved because a significant portion of the life-cycle cost of assets and capabilities comes in the R&D and production phases occur at the beginning. Spreading cost across the life-cycle is essential.

4. Conclusion

This is a very short roll on of main points that are inserted in a ESDP strategy and some principles identified inside. I cannot express my comprehensive understanding of

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what and how is suppose to run the whole process due to uncertainty of the entire environment.

Whatever, the role and ambition of the European Union in the very sensitive field of security and defence should be transformed, reformed and advanced. Decisions taken now by the memberstates over the future role of the EU as a security and defence main player will have an impact not just on the European order, but also on the global order.

Given by the complexity and uncertainty of not only the Europe but also the global security environment, the role that EU is trying to achieve in the security and defence domain related to all members could be unreachabeable on some main points. A real short terms analisys could reveal that is a non passing challenge to implement a real interoperability and a full compatibility between well developed nations from western Europe and East European nations, due to existence of a huge technological and economical gaps.

From this point of view, is more than clearly that at this moment, related to the ESDP required tasks, we cannot express that all nations could act in the same manner. It is necessary a well establish long term effort for these nations beside and with support from main pillars of Europe in order to reach at least minimum level of compatibility.

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